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The western philosophical tradition has spent over two thousand years talking 
about Plato’s Republic, and it remains today the second most commonly assigned text 
in college.1 This is to say that the Republic is perhaps the most talked about book in 
philosophy. As a result, there is a culturally inherited understanding of what the 
Republic says and is about. It is difficult to look at the text with unbiased eyes, although 
it is necessary to do so. I will do this by focusing on one individual, the interlocutor 
Adeimantus.
The philosophical discourse of the Republic is not the product of Socrates alone; 
his speech is influenced and critiqued by his conversation partners. Up until about fifty 
years ago, the interlocutors and the literary aspects of Plato’s dialogues were mostly 
disregarded as accessories, but scholars now know that they shape the meaning of the 
dialogue. Recently the interlocutors have received greater attention in Plato’s dialogues, 
but the interlocutors in the Republic specifically have not received comprehensive 
individual study.2 I argue that these interlocutors are meaningful, individual contributors 
to the philosophy of the dialogues, and that they require further examination. Each 
interlocutor engages with and contributes to the philosophical discourse in a distinct 
way. In the case of Adeimantus, his presence in the dialogue compliments Glaucon’s 
and demonstrates a different method of interacting with philosophy.
My exploration of Adeimantus in the Republic operates on two levels. How is 
Adeimantus important to the philosophy of the Republic, and, inversely, how is the
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philosophy of the Republic important to Adeimantus? These questions capture 
something that is at stake in Plato. By writing dialogues rather than treatises or essays, 
Plato depicts philosophy as it actively interacts with and influences individuals. If 
individuals are to know what philosophy means to them, then it is essential to 
investigate what philosophy means to the interlocutors, who are individuals much like 
us.
To begin to answer these questions, I identified the sections in which Adeimantus 
is the active interlocutor and read them in isolation. Almost immediately, a very 
particular pattern emerged: Adeimantus only speaks in interruptions. Plato also 
intentionally specifies or dramatizes his speech as interruption. For example, Socrates 
says "I had something in mind to say in response to [what Glaucon had said], but his 
brother Adeimantus said” and later says "and I was going to describe unjust regimes in 
order, but...” (Republic 362d, 449a-b). These moments are key because the text does 
not just say that Adeimantus interposes; Plato narrates the moment and has Socrates 
comment that he was about to say something else. In other words, Plato is calling our 
attention to the fact that Adeimantus’ interruptions cause the dialogue to digress. If 
Adeimantus did not interrupt, a different philosophical discourse would have taken 
place. In this way, Adeimantus’ importance cannot be overlooked. Additionally, while 
other characters interrupt, it is only Adeimantus’ interruptions that are most often 
dramatized, which means that Adeimantus’ interruptions are specifically characterized 
as digressive in contrast to those of the other interlocutors. For example,
Thrasymachus’ interruption in Book I is dramatized as being "like a wild beast,” but he
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interrupted "when [Polemarchus and Socrates] paused,” rather than when Socrates was 
about to say something else (336b).
While Plato intentionally places emphasis on Adeimantus as interrupting, this 
particularity of the Republic has been overlooked by today’s scholars. There is no 
scholarly study that focuses on Adeimantus’ role of interrupting and redirecting the 
dialogue. His interruption at the beginning of Book V, where he insists Socrates speak 
about women and children in more detail, has received a great deal of attention, but it 
has not been connected to a larger pattern of the character. More frustrating, 
interruption is a known rhetorical device in ancient Greek literature, yet the definitive 
book addressing the meaning of interruption, Daniel Smith’s The Rhetoric of 
Interruption: Speech Making, Turn Taking, and Rule Breaking, makes no mention of the 
Platonic dialogues at all. Smith remarks that "interrupted speech is comparatively rare in 
Ancient Greek literature,” so its dense presence in the Republic is noteworthy (Smith 1). 
Additionally, in the Ancient Greek literature Smith does analyze, he consistently notes 
that interruptions are signals of important moments in the literature, and so his analysis 
of literature such as Homer and Herodotus provides precedence for an analysis of 
interruption in Plato as well.3
As a result, the question of interruption cannot be overlooked for understanding 
Adeimantus. The question of interruption is the question of what Adeimantus is saying 
and what Plato is representing through him. Scholarly attention is almost always given 
to what Socrates says, but that is incomplete. By emphasizing the importance of the 
interlocutors, I propose a new way of looking at and reading the dialogue. With that in 
mind, the figure below is a visual representation of how looking to the interlocutors
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changes the way the whole of the Republic looks. Below is a diagram created to show 
which interlocutor speaks when, and for how long.
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they speak are noted. The lines to the side indicate the transition from one book to 
another.
We can see that Glaucon is the interlocutor approximately twice as often as 
Adeimantus, which could imply that Glaucon is Socrates’ main concern. Combined with 
the dramatic emphasis Plato puts on Adeimantus as an interruption and diverter of that 
conversation, the suggestion is that Glaucon and Socrates’ conversation is primary, and
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that Adeimantus is more of an observer who interrupts when he deems it necessary. 
When Adeimantus does speak, it is considerable, and he does not let Socrates and 
Glaucon speak uninterrupted for too long. Glaucon and Socrates speak for the longest 
without interruption in the final section. For some reason, Adeimantus leaves the 
dialogue quite early. At a certain point, whatever it was that motivated him to interrupt 
ceases.
The rhetoric of Adeimantus’ interruptions is revealing as well. It is interesting and 
instructive to compare the rhetoric of Adeimantus’ interruptions and examples that are 
characteristic of Glaucon.
Glaucon Adeimantus
"I want to hear you in turn condemn "You surely don’t imagine” (362d)
injustice and praise justice” (358d)
"You lead, and I’ll follow” (432c) "You don’t mean that at all” (362e)
"Lead on” (474c) "How would you defend yourself against the
charge...” (419a)
"It’ll be good enough” (506d) "You seem to be taking the lazy way out and
to be cheating us.” (449c)
"That’s a necessity” (576b) "All those who get themselves involved in
philosophy become for the most part quite 
warped.” (487d)
Glaucon trusts Socrates’ word as truth, and he desires to be convinced. He even 
explicitly asks for a persuasive speech at the beginning of Book II. Adeimantus, in 
contrast, is critical of Socrates. He is not convinced, nor does he express a desire to be 
convinced as Glaucon does. The question that motivates the dialogue, whether a just 
life is the happiest life, is Glaucon’s question, not Adeimantus’. Adeimantus’ questions
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are about the value and validity of Socrates’ arguments. What becomes evident is that 
Glaucon and Adeimantus are interacting with the philosophical discourse in 
fundamentally different ways. For Glaucon, the discourse is an object of experience, 
and, for Adeimantus, it is an object of examination or even confrontation. Glaucon is the 
student of philosophy who is actively undergoing the process. Adeimantus is outside the 
experience and observing. This places Adeimantus in the position of critic or judge.4
If Adeimantus is considered as a critic, then the underlying shape of the 
conversation can be considered differently. On the left is the traditional understanding of 
the interaction of the three characters.
Socrates Socrates
Adeimantus
G laucon Adeimantus Glaucon
In the former, Socrates is the largest figure and Glaucon and Adeimantus have the 
same relationship to him. Some scholars give more or less emphasis to Glaucon or 
Adeimantus, but they are often considered mostly similar. On the right is my new 
proposal. Adeimantus is explicitly described as interrupting, his interruptions are critical, 
and he is secondary to Glaucon, so Adeimantus is placed on the outside of the 
conversation between Glaucon and Socrates. This positioning also depicts the brothers 
engaging with philosophy in two different ways. In a sense, these are the two ways that 
readers engage with philosophy or with the Republic. A reader may choose to suspend 
disbelief in order to experience the text uninterrupted, or a reader may choose to remain 
skeptical of the text and interrogate it.
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These are typically engagements with philosophy that occur separately, but in 
the Republic the two interlocutors allow both of the engagements to occur at the same 
time. Readers are able to see philosophy judged as it is actively happening before us. 
Moreover, the questions that Adeimantus asks are the precise questions that Glaucon, 
someone being persuaded, cannot ask. Adeimantus asks what the best education of 
the youth is (376d). He asks whether philosophy is valuable or just useless and vicious 
(487d). He critiques the gods’ place in education (378b). He asks whether Socrates is 
making the people he speaks of happy (419a). Glaucon is currently being educated, 
experiencing philosophy, and, hopefully, being led toward a happy life. To ask 
Adeimantus’ questions, he would have to step outside of the education he is inside of. 
The questions Adeimantus asks are important in another way. They are in many ways 
reflective of the accusations made at Socrates’ trial, "corrupting the young and not 
believing in the gods” (Apology 24b). In that sense, they are the questions about the 
philosophical education most in need of answers. Adeimantus, of course, does not 
know these are the questions that will be asked in Socrates’ trial. From his current 
perspective, they are important because they are about the fate of his brother.
Of all his interruptions, Adeimantus’ last is the most revealing. After this 
exchange, Socrates and Adeimantus finish their conversation early, and so this is the 
exchange that resolves whatever was at the root of Adeimantus’ interruptions. Glaucon 
and Socrates had been discussing the decay of regimes in cities and in souls. Socrates 
has just asked Glaucon what he thinks the timocratic man, a man ruled by the love of 
honor, would be like when Adeimantus interrupts. Adeimantus says, "I imagine,” said 
Adeimantus, "for his love of victory at least, he’d come pretty close to this fellow right
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here, Glaucon” (Republic 548d). Socrates responds by defending Glaucon. "Maybe in 
that respect,” Socrates says, "but it seems to me he’d have a nature unlike his in these 
ways” (548e). Adeimantus’ final interruption reveals two things. Firstly, in his final 
conversation with Socrates, the topic is Glaucon’s soul. The questions Adeimantus 
asked earlier were heavily concerned with education and philosophy, which can be 
interpreted as questions about how those things will affect Glaucon. In his final 
interruption, Adeimantus brings up the topic of his brother directly, and his fear that his 
brother may be ruled by a love of honor. Socrates says that, in comparison to Glaucon, 
the timocratic man is less educated, less musical, more "obedient to rulers,” and would 
"judge himself worthy, not for his speaking but for warlike deeds.” (548e-549a). These 
remarks seem consistent with a soul less philosophic. Socrates seems to be implicitly 
defending the value of the education he has given Glaucon throughout the dialogue by 
demonstrating how philosophy may keep Glaucon from being timocratic. With the 
question of Glaucon satisfied, Adeimantus is satisfied. In some sense, the main 
question of Adeimantus all along was Glaucon.
There is one last development worth mentioning that may contribute to 
Adeimantus’ silence at the end of the dialogue. Shortly after Adeimantus and Socrates’ 
final discussion, there is a change in Glaucon and Socrates’ conversation. Socrates 
chooses this moment to reinstate the question and answer style of discussion. Earlier 
Glaucon had requested that Socrates give a persuasive speech, and Socrates has 
agreed. Now, however, Socrates disallows Glaucon from merely following Socrates’ 
discourse, and Socrates tells Glaucon that he must "look” and "examine” for himself the 
lives they are discussing. Socrates also criticizes lazy thinking. "It isn't enough,”
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Socrates tells Glaucon, to "just to assume these things... one needs to investigate 
carefully... for the investigation concerns the most important thing, namely, the good life 
and the bad one" (578c). This is all to show that Glaucon is now being forced to assume 
a more critical stance and to be an examiner. With this shift, Adeimantus does not need 
to fulfill that role or worry that his uncritical brother may be lead astray. The opening 
image of the Republic is of Socrates walking with Glaucon up to Athens. For 
Adeimantus, then, the evening begins with seeing his brother being led along with 
Socrates. Perhaps now he may think Glaucon more able to walk upward by himself.
When considered, it is evident that all of the philosophical discourse in the 
Republic is the result of an interruption. As Socrates and Glaucon walk up to Athens, 
Adeimantus and Polemarchus interrupt them. Everything that follows, the entirety of the 
Republic, is the result of that first interruption. What becomes evident is that interruption 
occupies a central place in Platonic and Socratic philosophy. Plato intentionally writes 
dialogues and Socrates engaged in them, and interruption is an inevitable part of 
dialogue. In the Republic, these interruptions can and do dictate the course of the 
conversation. Interruption affirms that philosophy, dialogue, and the Socratic method 
are, to some degree, dependent upon and particular to the individuals taking part. The 
conversation is unpredictable because it depends upon the interlocutors who may 
interrupt and detour, and it is particular because the content is shaped by the ideas, 
concerns, and abilities of the participants. If Adeimantus was not there, the Republic 
would not be the same, and the same can be said of all interlocutors. If individuals think 
of the Republic as acting on them, perhaps the whole of it is an interruption since the 
Republic interrupts the reader. The Republic begins fairly abruptly, and the conversation
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begins quickly and escalates. Readers are dropped unexpectedly into the text and have 
to figure it out. It, like any work of literature, takes the reader out of his or her life, and 
forces the reader to reconsider it in light of what was read.
David Roochnik notes that in the dialogue the Sophist, Socrates converses 
briefly with an unnamed man who does not want to participate in a dialogue (145). He 
would rather lecture, and "if he must converse, he wants a passive interlocutor” who will 
not interrupt him (145). This is not philosophy. Socrates in the dialogues is portrayed as 
radically different from a sophist or rhetorician; he contends with many diverse 
individuals, and he welcomes interaction from his listeners. Additionally, the absence of 
interruption is related to Plato’s critique of literature. In the Phaedrus, Socrates laments 
that the written word is insufficient "because if you want to learn more, it continues to 
signify just that very same thing forever” and "it doesn’t know to whom it should speak 
and to whom it should not” (Phaedrus 275d-e). Books cannot be interrupted or respond 
to particular readers, but Plato provides a depiction of interruption and particular 
interlocutors in the dialogues that points to their necessary place in philosophy.
As embodied by Adeimantus, to interrupt is to examine and to put ideas on trial. 
In some sense, interruption is what it means to do philosophy: to always ask questions 
and to always keep the dialogue changing and developing. To study the interlocutors is 
to ask the question of the interaction between philosophy and the individual. Through 
Adeimantus, Plato demonstrates that philosophy is interruption. Individuals interrupt 
dialogue and change the course of philosophy, and philosophy interrupts us and 
changes our course as well.
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Notes
1. This information is according to the Open Syllabus Project, an organization 
that compiles college syllabi. To date they have compiled over a million syllabi. With 
their compiled information, they have provided a ranking of the most commonly 
assigned texts. The Republic is second only to The Elements of Style by Strunk and 
Williams.
2. A brief sampling of recent works focusing on interlocutors includes but is not 
limited to: Beversluis, John. Cross-examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors 
in Plato’s Early Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000., Blondell, Ruby. The Play 
of Character in Plato's Dialogues. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2002., Nails, Debra. 
The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 2002., Craig, Leon Harold. The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic. 
Toronto: U of Toronto, 1996.
3. For example, he notes that "Herodotus reserved the use of intentional 
interruption for major turning points in the plot,” and three of the four interruptions in 
Herodotus are by an individual also named Adeimatus (Smith 48).
4. In scholarship, the difference between Adeimantus and Glaucon is often 
dismissed as Adeimantus being the less philosophical brother. However, considering 
him an examiner would suggest he may be more philosophical than Glaucon. The 
strongest example of this dismissal in Craig chapter 5. See also Bloom 344-46.
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